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Computational
theories of vision
Andrew Glennerster
Neuroscientists study the brain at
many different levels, from
molecular to psychological.
Despite progress on many of
these levels, there is a
disappointing lack of coherence in
neuroscience research: we have
yet to find an overarching
theoretical framework for
understanding what the brain
does.
Vision is one of the most
intensively studied areas of brain
function. Yet, even in this field,
there are wide disagreements
about the goals of cortical
processing. In the second half of
the twentieth century, there were
two important attempts to provide
a theoretical framework for
understanding vision, by David
Marr and James Gibson. There are
now grounds for optimism that
these two broad approaches can
be brought together to provide a
biologically plausible and yet
computationally tractable
framework for understanding and
imitating human vision. I shall
focus on attempts to describe
vision at the level Marr called
‘computational theory’.
Marr
Marr (1982) emphasised that
vision was nothing more than an
information-processing task. Any
such task, he argued, could be
described on three levels:
(i) computational theory;
(ii) specific algorithms; and
(iii) physical implementation. The
three levels correspond roughly
to: (i) defining the problem and
setting out how, in principle, it can
be solved; (ii) designing a detailed
simulation of the process; and
(iii) building a working system that
will carry it out (see Box 1). The
important point is that the levels
can be considered independently.
As a result, it ought to be possible
to mimic the algorithms underlying
biological vision in robots: the only
difference would be in how they
are implemented physically. This
concept of independent levels of
explanation remains a mantra of
vision research.
Marr attempted to set out a
computational theory for vision as
a whole. He suggested that visual
processing passes through a
series of stages, each
corresponding to a different
representation, from retinal image
to ‘3D model’ representation of
objects. One problem with this
account is that information needs
to be passed continually from one
coordinate frame to another.
There is increasing interest in
models that avoid coordinate
transformations of this kind, rather
using information stored in retinal
coordinates for tasks such as
object recognition or navigation
(for example Mallot, 2000).
Gibson
Like Marr, Gibson had a powerful
influence on vision research in the
last century. Marr himself wrote
Box 1
Marr’s three levels for understanding any visual process, each illustrated using the example of binocular stereopsis.
Recent neurophysiological investigations have improved our knowledge of the first stages of processing, in area V1 of the visual cortex,
after input from the two retinae have been combined but before the depth of points has been computed unambiguously (reviewed by
Cumming and DeAngelis, 2001). Other studies have identified neurons that appear to be beyond the stage at which depth is computed,
because firing of these neurons is remarkably predictive of the perceptual choice an animal will make in a depth-related task (for
example, Dodd et al., 2001). There are tantalisingly few synapses between these two neuronal stages, raising the hope that
understanding the processes between them may be a tractable problem. The role of these cells in depth perception will only be fully
understood, however, when their function can also be described at the levels of an algorithm and a computational theory.
Level Definition Example
Computational Sets out the goal of a process and an outline of how For binocular stereopsis, the input is (at least) the left
theory it can be achieved in principle. This includes and right eyes’ images; the output could be a depth
defining the input, the output and establishing the map of features as viewed from a point midway
constraints that will be used in computing one between the two eyes. An example of a constraint
from the other. is that a point in an image corresponds to one and
only one scene point (as the scene point must be
opaque for it to be visible). 
Algorithm Shows how a process is to be carried out. Gives Stereo algorithms often use sparse sets of features
details of how the input and output are represented (such as light/dark boundaries) as their input. 
and a set of rules for the transformation between Coarse-to-fine algorithms compute depth in blurred
the two. versions of the input images and use the results to 
help solve ambiguities at finer scales.
Implementation Specifies the physical method for carrying out an Disparity sensitive neurons have been identified at 
algorithm, for example in computer hardware or important stages in the process of stereopsis in 
using neurons. animals, some closer to the ‘input’ stage, others 
apparently closer to the 'output' stage. However, we
do not yet know the algorithm or even the 
computational theory underlying the process these
cells are involved in.
that “in perception, perhaps the
nearest anyone came to the level
of computational theory was
Gibson”. Gibson promoted an
‘ecological’ approach to studying
vision, by which he meant that
vision should be understood first
and foremost as a tool that
enables animals to achieve the
basic tasks required for life: avoid
obstacles, identify food or
predators, approach a goal and so
on (for example Gibson, 1979).
This viewpoint has gained
increasing influence. An emphasis
on survival of the organism is a
more promising basis for a
computational theory of vision
than Marr’s assertion that vision is
“knowing what is where by
looking”. Where Gibson infuriated
his contemporaries was in his
musings about the brain
mechanisms that might generate
these ‘ecological’ behaviours
(Ullman, 1980). Even when he
avoided any mention of brain
mechanisms and stuck to what
Marr would call the algorithmic
level, his proposals were often
loose or unclear (see Box 2).
Despite the criticisms, there has
been continued interest in
exploring the kind of ‘rule-based’
behavioural strategies that Gibson
advocated. A recurring theme
behind all these strategies is the
idea that out of the myriad
potential visual signals that could
be derived from a moving retinal
image, one or two aspects of the
information are especially relevant
for controlling a particular motor
behaviour. Recently, for example,
there has been interest in
recording the head and eye
movements of people carrying out
real-world tasks, such as driving.
It is clear from these studies how
a sequence of simple visuomotor
rules or sub-tasks could be linked
together to achieve a higher-order
goal. Take the task of making a
cup of tea, for which Land et al.
(1999) recorded the entire
sequence of head and eye
movements. The sub-tasks, such
as bringing the hand towards the
kettle lid, tend to be
straightforward visually guided
routines when examined
individually. The complexity of
behaviours may therefore evolve
in two ways: (i) by increasing the
range of different sensory
parameters available for
controlling the motor system, and
(ii) by storing increasingly long
sequences of sub-tasks that,
when strung together, achieve
higher-order goals.
The approaches advocated by
Marr and Gibson are not mutually
exclusive. Advances in computer
vision may help to bring the two
together. Mathematical rigour and
computational theory are brought
to bear here on tasks that,
increasingly, must be carried out
in unpredictable, ‘natural’
environments. One current
research theme that exemplifies
that process of resolution is
Bayesian inference.
Bayes
Bayesian inference is sometimes
couched in fearsome
mathematical terms, but the basic
idea is both straightforward and
highly relevant to understanding
animal behaviour.
The brain receives signals from
afferent (sensory) fibres. On the
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Box 2.
Using optic flow to land a plane. 
As the pilot approaches the air field, visible points move outwards, as shown by the
arrows. Gibson described this as 'optic flow'. The point from which the flow emerges
indicates the plane’s direction of heading (in computer vision, this is called the ‘epipole’).
One strategy for landing the plane is to keep the epipole centred on the runway. (Adapted
from Gibson (1979).)
In some ways, the strategy described here is deceptively simple. Gibson said that optic
flow was only generated by translation of the observer (movement through space).
Rotating the eye does not change the ‘optic array’ and so generates no optic flow. (This
is not quite enough, however, to define optic flow: a choice must be made about how to
relate different optic arrays. A sensible coordinate frame is one in which distant objects
remain stationary, such as the mountains (Glennerster et al. 2001)). Retinal flow is more
complicated than optic flow. The eyes often rotate with respect to the world as, for
example, when you fixate a nearby object and walk past it. The resulting ‘rotational flow’
is added to the ‘pure’ translational flow, which would be generated if you walked past the
object fixating a distant point. Thought of in this way, retinal flow is a confusing mixture
of two types of signal. Gibson himself was rather unclear on how the visual system was
supposed to use ‘optic flow’ given that it must start off with retinal flow.
There are two diverging hypotheses about how the brain deals with retinal flow. One
assumes that the visual system extracts the ‘translational’ flow, shown by the arrows in
this figure, by subtracting the rotational flow component (reviewed by Lappe et al., 1999).
Another assumes that the visuo-motor system uses task-specific strategies that avoid
computing translational flow. For example, Cutting et al. (1992) suggest that observers
could fixate on different points as they walk and, using a simple rule, change their
direction of gaze until it is aligned with their direction of heading. The difference between
these approaches is at the level of computational theory: they have different goals.
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basis of these, and of the
information it has stored
previously, the brain must
generate a response (ultimately, a
motor response). A reasonable
model for this process is that one
response is picked out of a list of
possibilities by choosing the most
appropriate in the organism’s
current context (for example, most
probably rewarded or least
probably punished).
It is here that Bayes’ formula is
useful. Bayes pointed out that the
probability of state S being the
case (such as ‘there is a kettle over
to my right’) given information I
(here, the sensory information the
brain receives) is directly
proportional to two quantities that
can, in principle, be estimated in
advance, and hence, in the context
of the brain, stored in memory. The
first quantity is the ‘prior’
probability of state S occurring,
P(S). This makes sense intuitively:
if you are forced to guess what the
current state of the world is and
you have no evidence (or highly
inconclusive evidence) at the
moment, you should guess a likely
rather than an unlikely state (these
prior probabilities being
determined on the basis of
previous experience). For example,
if the kettle was on your right the
last time you looked, it is a
reasonable assumption that the
fuzzy grey shape on the periphery
of your vision is (still) the kettle.
The second quantity
incorporates the actual data, I, and
gives an indication of how
conclusive it is. It is the probability
of receiving evidence I given that
the current state of the world really
is S, normalised by the total
probability of getting information I
(summed over all possible states).
Again, this makes sense intuitively.
For example, fuzzy grey shapes are
common in peripheral vision and
do not always arise from kettles, so
the evidence on its own is
inconclusive. Fixating the kettle is a
good way to improve the evidence.
The higher resolution image is
richer (and rarer) and more specific
to kettles. In general, if sensory
input I is both rare (P(I) is low) and
also characteristic of state S (P(I|S)
is high), then information I is good
evidence that the world is in state
S. Put more succinctly:
Bayes’ rule can be derived from an
assertion that the probability of S and I is
equal to that of I and S. If the two joint
probabilities are expressed in terms of
conditional events, this becomes P(S|I) P(I)
= P(I|S) P(S), from which the expression for
P(S|I) can be obtained.
Many perceptual phenomena
can be explained parsimoniously
using a Bayesian approach (see
Box 3 and a review by Knill and
Richards (1996)).
Bayesian inference fits well
with all of Marr’s levels of
description. It is a useful tool in
describing a problem at the level
of computational theory, making
Current Biology Vol 12 No 20
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Box 3.
A Bayesian model of a motion illusion. 
When a narrow, low-contrast rhombus, as in A, is moved to the right it appears to move
down as well (green arrow). This can be understood by (i) considering the set of stimuli
that could have produced the edge motion signals the observer receives and (ii) including
a ‘prior’ assumption that objects tend to move slowly (adapted from Weiss et al. 2002).
The left-hand plot in B shows the assumed ‘prior’ probability of velocities in horizontal
and vertical directions (Vx, Vy), where intensity is proportional to probability: low
velocities are favoured. The centre and right hand plots show the likelihood that an edge
moving at each velocity (Vx, Vy) generated the motion observed at the points marked by
the circles. For a high contrast edge, these velocities would all fall along a line. (The fact
that the velocity of an edge is not known uniquely is known as the ‘aperture problem’: it
arises because movement in the direction of the edge produces no local motion signal,
for example within the circle.) The line is blurred for the low-contrast stimulus because,
with some noise in the system, edges moving at other velocities can give rise to the same
motion signal.
The plot in C is obtained by multiplying the three plots in B together. This amounts to
following Bayes' rule to calculate the probabilities that the real object had a velocity (Vx,
Vy) which gave rise to the two motion signals measured at the circles (known as the
‘posterior’ probability). (Weiss et al. (2002) did this for all points in the stimulus, giving a
very similar result.) The mean (or peak) of the distribution is shifted, as shown by the
green ‘X’, away from the true velocity of the rhombus (shown by the ‘+’). It predicts the
direction of motion seen by subjects when presented with this stimulus.
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explicit what is to be computed
and the constraints that are to be
used to derive output from input.
It can be the basis of specific,
working models or algorithms
and it can be implemented in a
number of ways, such as in
neural networks. Following Marr’s
notion of independence between
levels, theories of neural
architecture in the brain that
might carry out this kind of
inference can be developed to
deal with the generic quantities
P(S), P(I) and P(I|S), without
reference to specific stimuli
(reviewed by Barlow, 2001).
At the same time, Bayesian
approaches fit well into the
evolutionary or ecological
perspective that Gibson
advocated. A simple organism,
with a simple behavioural
repertoire, needs only to divide
information about the organism’s
state with respect to the world
into a small number of
categories. It can use its motor
system to move between these
categories (this is, after all, the
only way it can know that a motor
movement has been successful).
A more complex behavioural
repertoire requires a greater
number of states to be
discriminated reliably. This
means that sensory systems
must evolve to help an organism
discriminate between the
contexts in which it will generate
different motor outputs. At
various stages in a task, the
sensory parameters that are most
helpful in discriminating (and
hence controlling) movements
will be quite different (see section
on Gibson). This leads to a view
of the cortex as a pool from
which evidence can be drawn.
From moment to moment, the
neurons with the most relevant
information may be located in
quite different parts of the cortex,
according to the demands of the
task.
Time
Proposals about how neural
signals are combined to give rise
to visual percepts include some
that do not provide a description
of the solution at the level of a
computational theory: an
example is the idea that
synchronised oscillations in the
firing rate of neurons in different
parts of the brain could account
for perceptual phenomena
(Singer, 1998). As they stand,
such theories have little
explanatory power.
A general weakness of these
and many other theories is the
failure to consider how
representations could be built up
over time. There is a tendency to
assume that neural responses
could somehow be combined to
generate a vivid reconstruction of
the scene in an instant. Not only
is this a daunting prospect, but
the computational problem is
amplified as time is brought into
the equation. Having
reconstructed the world, heaven
forbid that the observer now
move their eyes or their head!
That would entail a new
reconstruction and a new
problem of relating it to the one
created a moment ago. More
promising approaches focus on
the small, discrete goals of one
epoch (for example, a period of
fixation) and how these could be
combined, like the pieces of a
jigsaw, into a richer
representation (for example
Ballard et al. 1997, Land et al.
1999, Rensink, 2002).
This view brings Marr and
Gibson’s ideas together in
another way. Gibson emphasised
the role of vision as a tool for
action. One of the things that
makes human vision special is
our ability to carry out tasks
involving long sequences of
movements, each one simple if
considered in isolation, to
achieve our goals. The processes
involved in building up a vivid,
detailed visual representation are
perhaps best seen as a by-
product of that ability, taking
time and being divisible into
purposeful steps. But as Marr
emphasised, whatever the
processes turn out to be,
emulating them computationally
is the best way to understand
them fully.
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